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There is little consensus on how motor imagery ability should be measured in stroke
patients. In particular it is unclear how two methods tapping different aspects of the
motor imagery process relate to each other. The aim of this study was to investigate the
relationship between implicit and explicit motor imagery ability by comparing performance
of stroke patients and controls on a motor imagery questionnaire and a hand laterality
judgment task (HLJT). Sixteen ischemic stroke patients (36 ± 13 weeks post-stroke)
and 16 controls, matched by age (51 ± 10 years), gender (7 females) and handedness
(3 left-handed), performed a HLJT and completed a motor imagery questionnaire. Our
study shows that neither in the healthy controls nor in patients, a correlation is found
between the HLJT and the motor imagery questionnaire. Although the patient group
scored significantly lower than the control group on the visual motor imagery component
(U = 60; p = 0.010) and the kinesthetic motor imagery component (U = 63.5; p = 0.015)
of the questionnaire, there were no significant differences between patients and controls
on accuracy scores of the HLJT. Analyses of the reaction time profiles of patients and
controls showed that patient were still able to use an implicit motor imagery strategy in
the HLJT task. Our results show that after stroke performance on tests that measure two
different aspects of motor imagery ability, e.g., implicit and explicit motor imagery, can
be differently affected. These results articulate the complex relation phenomenological
experience and the different components of motor imagery have and caution the use of
one tool as an instrument for use in screening, selecting and monitoring stroke patients in
rehabilitation settings.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to imagine or simulate experiences is one of the most
extraordinary capabilities of our mind. At first glance, certainly
when our brain is intact, we do not realize that this capacity is
more complex than the single homogenous capacity of imagery
which we experience. Several studies have shown that mental
imagery is a multifaceted capacity involving a number of different
cognitive functions and brain areas (for a review see Kosslyn et al.,
2001). Visual and motor imagery for instance are known to be
linked with different neuronal subsystems and there is ample evi-
dence of individual differences in imagery ability (Galton, 1883;
Kosslyn, 1980; Richardson, 1994; Borst and Kosslyn, 2010). The
present study addresses a specific question relating to measuring
motor imagery ability in stroke patients, namely the question of
how measures of implicit and explicit motor imagery relate to
each other.
The use and explanation of the term motor imagery has led to
substantial confusion about what the exact definition of motor,
kinesthetic and visual imagery is and how these different per-
spectives are used by participants in practice. Classically motor
imagery was defined as either from an internal, first person,
perspective (as if someone was actually performing the imag-
ined movement) or an external, third person, perspective (as if
someone watched himself making the movement form outside of
his body). Considerable confusion arose whether internal kines-
thetic imagery should be dissociated from internal visual imagery
(see also Hardy, 1997; Roberts et al., 2008 for a discussion).
More recently, several researcher have concluded, independently,
that the kinesthetic and first person internal perspective are best
measured with a separate subscale in self-report questionnaires,
reflecting a consensus on a more differentiated approach to mea-
suring motor imagery ability (Roberts et al., 2008; Williams et al.,
2012).
The debate leading to the confusion focused for a large part
on the specific modalities in which movements could be imag-
ined. According toMoran et al. (2012) some researchers appear to
regard the use of the term kinesthetic motor imagery synonymous
with an internal perspective whereas others have shown that the
kinesthetic modality could also be experienced concurrently with
the use of a third person, external, perspective (Hardy and Callow,
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1999; Callow and Hardy, 2004). This latter position is in close
accordance with neuroscience research showing that although dif-
ferent networks in the brain are involved with kinesthetic and
visual imagery (see Jeannerod, 2001; Kosslyn et al., 2001 for a dis-
cussion) that these networks can also be activated simultaneously
and are inherently tied to each other (Klatzky, 1994).
Jeannerod, in an influential account on the organization of
action control in the brain, argued that representations that
are used in the control of motor functions were also used in
other cognitive domains, referring to motor imagery as a covert
stage of action control (Jeannerod, 1994). Jeannerod and Frak
defined motor imagery as “a subliminal activation of the motor
system, a system which appears to be involved, not only in pro-
ducing movements, but also in imagining actions, recognizing
tools, learning by observation or even understanding the behavior
of other people” (Jeannerod and Frak, 1999). More in particu-
lar, Jeannerod made a distinction between implicit and explicit
motor imagery. He defined explicit motor imagery as the phe-
nomenological experience where the feeling of the movement was
experienced consciously. Explicit motor imagery ability is often
measured with an introspective self-report such as the VMIQ-2,
the KVIQ and the MIQ-R, where the vividness, clarity or easy
with which the imagery is experienced is rated (Malouin et al.,
2007; Roberts et al., 2008; Gregg et al., 2010). In contrast with
explicit motor imagery, Jeannerod argued that motor imagery is
also used implicitly. Here the representations of the motor system
are used covertly, without awareness. Task relying on perceptually
driven motor decisions, for instance judging whether a depicted
hand is a left or a right hand, rely on the covert use of motor
images. Also, prospective action judgments, for instance judg-
ing whether a dowel is graspable with a particular grip style, are
examples of tasks relying on an implicit use of the motor system.
Characteristic of both forms of motor imagery in this account
is the fact that the neural structures underpinning motor imagery
share a remarkable neurological similarity with neural activity
during movement execution. First, several studies showed that
during imagination of a movement, more or less the same brain
areas are involved as during the actual execution of a movement
(Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2001; de Lange et al., 2005,
2008). Another similarity between execution and imagery of a
movement is the equality in the time needed to mentally and
physically perform the same movement (Decety and Jeannerod,
1995), a phenomenon known as mental isochrony. Further, there
are strikingly similar physiological changes during movement
imagination and actual performance (Guillot and Collet, 2005).
Interestingly, research into both forms of motor imagery, has
shown very similar evidence for this covert use of the motor
system in motor imagery. For instance, when asked to imag-
ine walking between two points, the duration of the imagined
walk is similar to time it would take to actual walk the same
distance (Decety et al., 1989), and also shows a similar activ-
ity in neural areas used for motor planning and control (Roth
et al., 1996). In the same regard, Parsons showed, when per-
ceptually driven motor decisions are made whether a depicted
hand is a left or a right hand [the hand laterality judgment task
(HLJT)], that the time to judge whether the depicted hand is
a left or right hand corresponds to the time it would take to
actually perform a rotation of the arm and wrist in the orien-
tation of the depicted hand (Parsons, 1987). Moreover, reaction
times also corresponded with the awkwardness of the movement,
biomechanical awkwardmovements took longer to complete, and
several researchers showed corresponding activity in the motor
areas of the brain when solving the HLJT (Parsons et al., 1995;
Vingerhoets et al., 2002). These studies show that the biomechan-
ical constraints and kinematic characteristics of actual movement
are reflected in the performance of both implicit and explicit
motor imagery measures. Therefore, it appears that implicit and
explicit motor imagery are supported by motor representations
of the motor system and that these processes seem to rely, at least
partly, on equivalent underpinning mechanisms.
There is also long known neuropsychological evidence show-
ing a dissociation between what can be consciously perceived and
visual-motor abilities after lesions (see Willingham, 1998 for a
discussion). For instance, in the visual-spatial domain, Milner
and Goodale (1995) studied a patient who had limited conscious
awareness of objects and was unable to recognize everyday objects
or identify simple shapes visually. The same patient showed nor-
mal visual-motor abilities. The patient was perfectly able to orient
a postcard correctly in line with a slit and was able to position
the hand and fingers optimally for grasping objects. Examples
of patients like the patient described by Milner and Goodale are
also part of an on-going discussion about the boundaries between
implicit and explicit memory. There is a large body of evidence
showing that there are substantial differences between implicit
and explicit learning and that these processes rely on different
brain systems, although evidence of a partly common mecha-
nism also exist (Dew and Cabeza, 2011). Moreover, it is now
evident that motor skills can be learned implicitly (Masters, 1992;
Jiménez and Méndez, 1999, 2001; Maxwell et al., 2003), even
after stroke (Pohl et al., 2001; Orrell et al., 2006) without being
consciously aware of what is learned. Moreover, in the domain
of visual imagery an interesting study of a patient is described
by Zeman et al. (2010) who rated himself as having almost no
subjective visual imagery experiences.
These findings are relevant for recent developments in the field
of rehabilitation. In the past decades motor imagery is increas-
ingly been recommended as an additional technique that can be
used for motor recovery in stroke rehabilitation (Jackson et al.,
2001; Sharma et al., 2006; de Vries and Mulder, 2007). Herein,
there has recently been an advocacy for the use of instruments to
assess motor imagery ability of patients before they enter reha-
bilitation programs where motor imagery is used (Jackson et al.,
2001; Braun et al., 2006, 2013 in this issue; de Vries and Mulder,
2007; Simmons et al., 2008) And, although a recent review has
shown that a large number of studies still do not use motor
imagery ability measures (Malouin et al., 2013 in this issue)
a number of them do and they include both implicit and as
well as explicit measures and there are also advances in devel-
oping instruments specific for the use in rehabilitation settings
(Malouin et al., 2007, 2009; Gregg et al., 2010; Butler et al.,
2012). However, there has been surprisingly little research about
how self-report questionnaires that assess the vividness or ease
of motor imagery ability relate to measures of implicit motor
imagery when administered to stroke patients. To date, there is no
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consensus which instruments should be part of a motor imagery
ability assessment and researchers use different instruments for
screening purposes. In some studies implicit measures are used,
others use only self-report questionnaires whereas others use a
mix of different methods for assessing motor imagery ability.
Given that lesions to the action system can affect implicit and
explicit cognitive processing differently (see Willingham, 1998;
Dew and Cabeza, 2011 for a discussion) shows that it is important
to establish what the relationship between measures for implicit
motor imagery ability and self-report rating is, particularly in the
stroke population.
A recent study byMcAvinue and Robertson (2007) with young
healthy adults using a large test battery of motor and visual
imagery measures is one of the few studies which shed some
light on this issue. They showed that self-report ratings of motor
imagery ability and tests that measure implicit motor imagery
ability loaded onto different components, suggesting (in accor-
dance with Jeannerod) an implicit and explicit component for
motor imagery. In the same regard, Collet et al. (2011) have
noticed that individual performance on different measures for
motor imagery could vary and have made the suggestion that
motor imagery ability might be best measured by using a com-
bination score of different measures. However, these were studies
including healthy adults which makes it difficult to generalize
these findings to the stroke population. A study on stroke patients
by Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) did also show evidence for a
double dissociation between measures that require implicit judg-
ments and measures that require explicit judgments. However,
Schwoebel and Coslett did not include self-report ratings of the
subjective experience of motor imagery in their study.
Given the lack of studies in stroke patients on the relation-
ship between explicit self—report ratings and implicit measures
of motor imagery ability it is unclear how they relate to each
other. It could be that when a patient is impaired on one mea-
sure that he is also likely impaired on the other. However, the
research by McAvinue and Robertson (2007) and Schwoebel and
Coslett (2005) suggest that this need not be the case. Also, the
study of the patient described Zeman et al. (2010) showed that, in
the domain of visual imagery, the subjective experience of visual
imagery could be absent after brain injury. A better insight in
how implicit and subjective experience of explicit motor imagery
relate to each other could contribute to a consensus on howmotor
imagery ability instruments can be used in the rehabilitation prac-
tice. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore the prevalence
of implicit and explicit motor imagery ability impairments and
investigate the relationship between implicit and explicit motor
imagery ability by comparing performance of stroke patients and
controls on two different methods tapping both aspects of motor
imagery.
Phenomenological self-report ratings that measure the vivid-
ness or ease of motor imagery ability require a conscious explicit
judgment. Therefore, we used a motor imagery questionnaire,
the MIQ-RS (Gregg et al., 2010), for measuring explicit motor
imagery ability. A second method, perceptually driven motor
decision tasks requires an unconscious judgment from the partic-
ipant. Therefore, the HLJT was used formeasuring implicit motor
imagery ability (Parsons, 1987). We used the MIQ-RS because
of the focus in this scale on items related to hand function-
ing. Thereby maximizing it’s similarity with the HLJT. A simple
choice reaction time task and a visual mental rotation task were
used to control for non-motor-imagery specific cognitive impair-
ments. With this setup we wanted to study what the prevalence
of impairments on these instruments was and study the relation-
ship between these measures of motor imagery ability is in stroke
patients. Based on the results of the neuropsychological studies
showing a dissociation between implicit and explicit cognitive
processes and the study ofMcAvinue and Robertson (2007) where
in healthy adults no correlation between the measures for implicit
and explicit motor imagery were found we expected that patients
would performmore poorly than controls onmotor imagery tests
but that conscious awareness of the ease with which a move-
ment is imagined does not have to correlate with implicit motor
imagery ability.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In total sixteen patients (7 female, mean age 51.06 ± 10.74 years,
3 left-handed, 7 right hemisphere lesions) recovering from an
ischemic stroke (36 ± 13 weeks ago) participated on voluntary
basis in this the study. The participants took part in this study as
part of a longitudinal study on monitoring motor imagery abil-
ity in stroke patients. Patients were recruited from stroke units of
two rehabilitation centers in the Netherlands, UMCGBeatrixoord
in Haren and Rehabilitation Friesland in Beetsterzwaag. A con-
trol group of sixteen healthy participants, matched by gender,
age (51.38 ± 10.03 years) and handedness (Oldfield, 1971), were
included. The ethical committee of the medical center of the
University of Groningen approved the study protocol and a writ-
ten informed consent was obtained from each participant before
entering this study. The major inclusion criteria were a unilat-
eral impaired motor function of the upper limb following stroke
[wrist dorsiflexion, MRC < 5 (Gregson et al., 2000)] and stroke
onset 16–52 weeks prior to participation in this study. Patients
were excluded when they had a history of repeated strokes,
severe cognitive dysfunction [MMSE< 24 (Folstein et al., 1975)],
severe receptive aphasia (inability to understand test instruc-
tions), neglect, visual problems, neurological disorders or comor-
bidity which could interfere with this study. Patients had to be
able to understand Dutch. Further, patients that participated in
another intensive study were not able to participate in this study.
INSTRUMENTS
Explicit motor imagery: motor imagery questionnaire
Amotor imagery questionnaire based on theMIQ-RS was admin-
istrated as an explicit motor imagery task (Gregg et al., 2010).
The MIQ-RS was chosen because it includes items of functional
tasks specifically aimed at hand movements (e.g., grasp a glass,
push a door). Thereby, the items of the MIQ-RS correspond
closely to the HLJT. The MIQ-RS questionnaire is shown to be
a reliable and valid measure for motor imagery ability (Gregg
et al., 2010) and is developed specifically as an instrument for
the stroke population (Butler et al., 2012). Although the MIQ-RS
is specifically aimed at this population, some adjustments in the
protocol had to be made for administration in patients with more
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severe motor impairments. First, not all participants managed to
completely perform the movement physically because of the vari-
ability in motor function of the upper extremity and difficulties
of some patient to stand unsupported. Therefore, the test leader
demonstrated the movements that had to be imagined to the par-
ticipants. All participants performed the test in a sitting position.
Patients as well as controls performed this task procedure in the
same manner. To facilitate imagery from an internal first person
perspective the examiner took place next to the participant while
demonstrating the movement and participants were instructed to
imagine from a first person perspective. Second, in the original
MIQ-RS each action was administrated two times (from a first
person visual and a kinesthetic perspective), but in our study also
the non-dominant and dominant sides were assessed separately,
as is suggested by Malouin et al. (2007). Adherence to the goals
of the items in the questionnaire was checked by the examiner by
asking how the participant imagined the action by asking what
the person saw and felt.
Each item consists of the following stepwise procedure. First,
the participant was asked to assume the start position: sitting on
a chair with backrest and with their hands on their lap. Second,
the examiner sat on a chair in front of the participant and then
took place next to the participant and demonstrated a movement
supported by a verbal description of that movement. Third, the
experimenter took place in front of the participant and partici-
pants were asked to close their eyes and imagine either seeing or
feeling as clear and vivid as possible the just demonstrated move-
ment. In the last step of each item, the participant had to rate their
experience of the ease/difficulty they could imagine the move-
ment on an ordinal rating scale from 1 (very hard to feel/see) up
to 7 (very easy to feel/see) from the visual and the kinesthetic per-
spective (For a detail description of the used items, instructions
and protocol see Gregg et al., 2010).
Implicit motor imagery: computerized imagery task
We used a computerized task that consisted of three parts; a sim-
ple choice reaction time task, a visual imagery task and a HLJT.
During the computer test, all participants sat in front of a laptop
screen in a chair with a backrest. All participants started with the
simple choice reaction time task. The visual imagery task and the
HLJT were randomized between participants. In all three tasks,
two types of stimuli were presented on the computer screen. The
participants had to react as fast and accurate as possible on these
stimuli by pressing the left or right button on a response box
(Psychological Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The stimulus dis-
appeared from the screen when the participant pressed the button
or when the stimulus was presented for 10 s. The responses were
given with the hand of the unaffected limb. Their matched con-
trols executed the task with the same hand regardless of their
hand dominance to control for confounding effects. For each
task performance was assessed by calculating the average response
time (in milliseconds) and the accuracy (percentage of correct
responses). Before the start of each test, the participant had the
opportunity to practice the task in a block of 48 stimuli. The visual
imagery task and the HLJT each contained a total 216 stimuli,
divided in three blocks of 72 stimuli with a short break period
between the blocks.
Simple choice reaction time task. A simple choice reaction time
task was included to control whether simple reaction time was
affected in stroke patients. The HLJT is based on time isochrony
and therefore it is important to control whether a latency in reac-
tion time on the HLJT is the result of impaired motor imagery
ability instead of a more general impaired reaction time. The
participants had to react to two types of presented stimuli, an
“O” or “X,” by pressing respectively the left or right button on
a response box.
Hand laterality judgment task. Implicit motor imagery was
assessed with a HLJT (Parsons, 1987). Participants had to deter-
mine the laterality of a rotated hand presented on the computer
screen. The hands were shown from the backside or palm side of
the hand. The stimuli of presented hands were rotated at six dif-
ferent angles, covering the full circle at a spacing of 60◦ (0, 60, 120,
180, 240, 300◦). The orientation of the hand with fingers pointing
upward was defined as an angle of 0◦. Participants had to react to
these stimuli by pressing the button (left or right) corresponding
to the laterality of the hand. The participants were not allowed
to rotate their hand or look at their own hand during this task.
Adherence to this task procedure was carefully controlled by the
experiment leader, who was present during the whole experiment.
Visual imagery task. The visual imagery task (de Lange et al.,
2005) was included in this study to control whether the partic-
ipants performance on the HLJT was related to visual imagery
ability. Stimuli of mirror-reversed and regular capital alphabetic
characters, “R” and “F,” were presented on the computer screen.
The characters were rotated at the same angles (0, 60, 120, 180,
240, 300◦) as stimuli in HLJT. The orientation when the “R” or
“F” was upright was described as an angle of 0◦. Participants had
to decide as fast and accurate as possible whether the letter was a
mirror-reversed or a normal letter by pressing respectively the left
or right button on the response box.
Brunnström Fugl-Meyer scale
The arm-hand function of the affected limb was administrated
with the Brunnström Fugl-Meyer scale (BFM) (Fuglmeyer et al.,
1975). The Fugl-Meyer scale is shown to be a reliable and valid
tool for the evaluation of motor recovery in stroke patients
(Gladstone et al., 2002). This test is used in clinical settings for
determining reflexes, movement, coordination and speed of the
upper extremity. Each item could be scored with 0–2 points on
an ordinal scale (0 = no movement possible; 1 = impaired move-
ments possible; 2=movements possible). A total score was inside
a range of 0–60 points, because reflexes were not examined in this
study.
Utrecht arm/hand Test
The Utrecht Arm/hand Test (UAT) is a clinical measure to obtain
the arm-hand function of patients (van Reenen et al., 2001). The
items of this test are scored on an ordinal scale where eight items
represent the following function of the upper limb: a-functional
arm (score 0); flexion-synergy (score 1), first distal selectivity
(score 2), wrist dorsal flexion (score 3), hook grip (score 4), cylin-
der grasp (score 5), tweezers grasp (score 6), and clumsy hand
(score 7).
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PROCEDURE
The testing procedure was similar for all participants. The assess-
ment took place in a quiet room in one of the rehabilitation
centers or at home. The measurement started with the com-
puterized imagery tasks. This was followed by the examination
of the motor function. Finally, the MIQ-RS questionnaire was
completed by the participants.
DATA ANALYSIS
For the computer task, mean reaction times of correct responses
and mean accuracy scores of responses with a latency between
350 and 10.00ms were calculated and included in the analysis.
First analyses revealed no differences between stimuli or items
of the affected or the non-affected limb in patients and there-
fore left and right stimuli were grouped together for both the
questionnaire as well as for the computer task. First a reliabil-
ity analysis was done for the visual and kinesthetic component
of the adapted MIQ-RS. Then total mean scores were calculated
for the visual and kinesthetic components of the adapted MIQ-
RS. In accordance with Page et al. (2001), who used a cut-off
of 25 (on a maximum of 56 on the original MIQ-R scale), a
mean score on one of the subscales below section Differences
in Imagery Ability Between Patients and Controls was consid-
ered as low imagery ability. Because of non-normal distributed
data, non-parametric tests were used for analysis. The differ-
ence between the control and the patient group was determined
with a Mann-Whitney U test, with α < 0.05. To control whether
individual patients differed significantly on the computer task
from the control group, a modified T-test with α < 0.05 was
used (Crawford and Howell, 1998). The relationship between
the MIQ-RS, HLJT, visual imagery task, BFM, and UAT was
calculated with a Spearman correlation coefficient. Finally, to
determine which strategies were used by the patients and the
control group, separate repeated measures ANOVAs were per-
formed on the RTs for the HLJT and the visual imagery task.
To determine whether participants still use a motor strategy
in solving a motor imagery task the stimuli were collapsed in
sets of comfortable (medial) and awkward (lateral) orientations
resulting in two within-participants factors for the ANOVA:
biomechanical orientation (awkward, comfortable) and rotation
(60, 120◦), and with group (patients, controls) as a between-
subjects factor. A corresponding ANOVA setup was also used
for the visual imagery task with alphanumeric character ori-
entation (clockwise, anticlockwise) and rotation (60, 120◦) as
within-subject factors, and with group (patients, controls) as a
between-subjects factor. All data were analyzed with IBM SPSS
version 17.0.
RESULTS
INTERNAL RELIABILITY
Cronbach’s alpha for the visual motor imagery subscale of the
MIQ-RS was high with α = 0.98 for the patient group, and
α = 0.95 for the control group. Cronbach’s alpha for the kines-
thetic motor imagery subscale of the MIQ-RS was also high with
α = 0.98 for the patient group, and α = 0.98 for the control
group.
DIFFERENCES IN IMAGERY ABILITY BETWEEN PATIENTS AND
CONTROLS
Patient group vs. control group
Table 1 shows the results on the questionnaire and HLJT for the
group of patients and the group of controls. Patients scored sig-
nificantly lower on both, the visual motor imagery component
(U = 60; p = 0.010) and the kinesthetic motor imagery compo-
nent (U = 63.5; p = 0.015) of theMIQ-RS compared to controls.
In the simple choice reaction time task, the reaction time did not
differ significantly between the group of patients and controls
(U = 24; p = 0.200). Also the accuracy on this task was simi-
lar for both groups (U = 105.5; p = 0.355). The patients reacted
slower on the visual imagery task (U = 68; p = 0.024) as well as
on HLJT (U = 58; p = 0.008) compared to the control group. No
significant differences between patients and controls were found
on the visual imagery accuracy score (U = 93.5; p = 0.189) and
the accuracy score on the HLJT (U = 111.5; p = 0.532).
Individual patients vs. control group
The individual score of patients on the questionnaire, hand lateral-
ity task and the BFM and UAT are shown in Table 1. Six out of the
16 patients (37.5%) scored below the cut-off on the visual imagery
component of the questionnaire indicating impaired visual motor
imagery ability. Eight patients (50%) scored below the cut-off on
the kinesthetic imagery component of the questionnaire indicat-
ing impaired kinesthetic imagery ability. Three patients scored
lower on the kinesthetic component without scoring lower on
the visual component of the MIQ-RS (patients 5, 13, and 16).
One patient, patient 14 scored lower on the visual component of
the motor imagery scale without scoring lower on the kinesthetic
component. A significantly lower reaction time than the control
group was found for two patients in the simple choice reaction
time task, two patients in the visual motor imagery task, and three
patients in the HLJT. Patient 2 (see Table 1) scored significantly
below the mean reaction time of the control group on all three
tasks. Twoof the 16patients had significantly lower accuracy scores
both on the visual imagery task and HLJT. Two patients showed
less accurate responses independently on the visual imagery task
and one patient only on the HLJT. Only one of the patients with
low accuracy scores on one of the computerized imagery tasks
scored at around chance level (patient 5). All other patients scored
well above chance on the computerized imagery tasks.
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE QUESTIONNAIRE, THE HAND
LATERALITY TASK AND THE VISUAL IMAGERY TASK
The Spearman correlation coefficients between MIQ-RS and the
computerized imagery task for the groups of controls and patients
are respectively shown in Tables 2, 3. No significant correlation
was found between the scores on the components of question-
naire and hand laterality task or visual imagery task for patients or
controls. A significant positive correlation between the visual and
kinesthetic motor imagery component of the questionnaire was
found in both groups. This was the only significant correlation
between imagery measures in patients. There were no significant
correlations between measures for implicit and explicit motor
imagery in both groups. Table 2 shows, for the control group, a
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Table 1 | Scores (mean/SD) on the MIQ-RS and hand laterality task, the object identification task and the visual imagery task for the group of
controls and patients and the individual patient scores for the UAT and BFM (N = 16).
MIQ-RS SCT VIT HLJT UAT BFM
V K RT ACC RT ACC RT ACC
Controls 5.9 (1.0) 4.9 (2.0) 479 ± 86 98 ± 3 903 ± 249 97 ± 3 1704 ± 564 93 ± 5
Patients 4.0 (2.1)* 3.1(2.1)* 523 ± 95 98 ± 2 1118 ± 227* 94 ± 7 2568 ± 902* 89 ± 1
1 7.0 7.0 470 96 1275 100 4873* 94 7 60
2 1.1+ 1.0+ 698* 100 1574* 93 3322* 93 3 31
3 2.9+ 1.6+ 579 96 830 99 2368 87 6 59
4 1.0+ 1.0+ 378 98 981 96 1560 96 7 59
5 4.9 1.7+ 554 100 1493* 93 1827 39* 7 60
6 4.8 5.1 494 96 1301 96 2525 93 7 55
7 4.4 4.0 685* 98 1034 89* 1866 91 7 58
8 6.3 5.2 496 96 968 77* 2462 78* 7 60
9 5.4 5.4 540 96 1120 83* 3414* 81* 6 35
10 1.9+ 1.0+ 563 98 1194 88* 1632 99 0 0
11 6.2 5.8 445 98 799 99 1505 98 7 58
12 3.6 3.6 421 100 863 100 2565 94 0 2
13 6.0 1.0+ 658 100 1074 98 2560 98 4 34
14 1.6+ 3.4 470 100 964 100 2311 94 6 55
15 1.1+ 1.2+ 421 98 1303 97 3755* 97 7 59
16 6 2.0+ 500 100 1112 94 2536 92 7 60
SCT, Simple choice task; VIT, Visual Imagery Task; HLJT, Hand Laterality Judgment Task; V, visual motor imagery component (score); K, kinesthetic imagery
component (score); RT, reaction time (ms); ACC, accuracy (% correct responses).
*Significantly different compared to the control group.
+Below the cut-off score.
high significant positive correlation between the accuracy of the
HLJT and visual imagery task. The positive correlation between
the reaction time of implicit HLJT and the visual imagery task
was also significant in the control group. The reaction time on the
visual imagery task was negatively correlated with the accuracy
on the same task in the control group. No significant correlation
was found between the UAT and BFM and the different types of
imagery. The UAT and BFM did correlate significantly with each
other.
REACTION TIME ANALYSIS
A repeated measures ANOVA on the reaction time scores of the
HLJT showed a main effect of orientation, with F(1, 30) = 13, 78,
p < 0.01, rotation, with F(1, 30) = 40, 24, p < 0.001 and a signif-
icant interaction between orientation and group, with F(1, 30) =
5, 58, p < 0.05, rotation and group, with F(1, 30) = 7, 62, p <
0.05 and between orientation and rotation, with F(1, 30) = 4, 20,
p = 0.05. Post-hoc analysis showed that patients were significantly
slower than controls on lateral, more awkward, orientated stim-
uli of hands than on medial orientations with the same extend
of rotation. Analysis of the reaction times of the visual imagery
task only showed a main effect of rotation with F(1, 30) = 96, 13,
p < 0.001. No further main or interaction effects were found for
the visual imagery task.
DISCUSSION
With this study we wanted to explore the prevalence of implicit
and explicit motor imagery ability impairments and investigate
the relationship between implicit and explicit motor imagery
ability measures in stroke patients. Patients in this study scored
significantly below controls on both the visual and the kinesthetic
component of the adapted MIQ-RS. However, they did not differ
significantly from the control group on the accuracy scores of the
HLJT or the visual imagery task. More importantly, our results
showed that there is discrepancy between performance of stroke
patients on the explicit and implicit motor imagery tasks. The
results from this study showed no significant correlations between
the HLJT and the MIQ-RS. Neither in stroke patients, nor in age
matched controls, a significant correlation between implicit and
self-reported explicit motor imagery ability was found. To our
knowledge this the first time that a divergence between results
on a phenomenological explicit motor imagery measure and an
implicit motor imagery measure is shown in stroke patients.
Our results show that the subjective experience of the ease of
imagining a movement does not have to be related to implicit
motor imagery ability after stroke. These results are in linewith the
model of overt and covert action simulation and the distinction
therein between explicit and implicit motor imagery proposed
by Jeannerod (2001). The results are also in close accordance
with the study of McAvinue and Robertson (2007) where also
no correlation between implicit and explicit motor imagery was
found. However, in the study of McAvinue and Robertson (2007)
only healthy adults were included. In our study we extend these
results by showing that also in stroke patients no correlation
is found between the phenomenological experience of motor
imagery and the performance on implicit motor imagery ability.
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Table 2 | Spearman correlations between the questionnaire, hand laterality task visual imagery task of controls (N = 16).
Questionnaire Hand laterality task Visual imagery task
V K RT ACC RT ACC
Questionnaire V 1
K 0.50* 1
Hand laterality task RT 0.00 −0.13 1
ACC 0.35 0.26 −0.27 1
Visual imagery task RT −0.15 −0.06 0.86** −0.48 1
ACC 0.32 0.20 −0.37 0.67** −0.53* 1
V, visual motor imagery component (score); K, kinesthetic imagery component (score); RT, reaction time; ACC, accuracy.
*p < 0.05 **p <0.01.
Table 3 | Spearman correlations between the questionnaire, the hand laterality task and the visual imagery task of patients (N = 16).
Questionnaire Hand laterality task Visual imagery task Motor function
V K RT ACC RT ACC BFM UAT
Questionnaire V 1
K 0.69** 1
Hand laterality task RT 0.14 0.15 1
ACC −0.23 −0.32 −0.10 1
Visual imagery task RT −0.13 −0.25 0.42 −0.11 1
ACC −0.04 0.10 0.14 0.43 −0.37 1
Motor function BFM 0.38 0.30 −0.04 −0.45 0.02 −0.02 1
UAT 0.33 0.42 −0.16 −0.27 0.08 −0.09 0.83** 1
V, visual motor imagery component (score); K, kinesthetic imagery component (score); RT, reaction time (ms); ACC, accuracy % correct responses).
**p < 0.01.
In the light of the recent advocacy for screening formotor imagery
ability in motor-imagery based rehabilitation programs (Jackson
et al., 2001; Braun et al., 2006, 2013 in this issue; de Vries
and Mulder, 2007; Simmons et al., 2008) these results have an
important clinical implication. Our study shows that by selecting
patients on the basis of subjective reports only, researchers could
risk excluding patients that might still have intact motor imagery
ability. Therefore, a screening procedure where different imagery
measures are used seemsmore appropriate for the use of screening
stroke patients in motor-imagery based rehabilitation programs.
We used the MIQ-RS as a measure for the vividness of
explicit motor imagery ability. We chose the MIQ-RS specifically
because of the items in this questionnaire focus on arm and hand
movements, thereby maximizing the relationship with the HLJT.
However, although the MIQ-RS has shown to be a reliable and
valid measure for motor imagery ability (Gregg et al., 2010) and is
also developed specifically for use in the stroke population (Butler
et al., 2012) we did make some adjustments to the protocol that
could have influenced our results. Because not all stroke patients
were able to complete all movements physically, all participants
had to watch a demonstration of the intended movement instead
of performing the movement themselves. Therefore, we cannot
be sure that all participants did indeed use an internal motor
imagery strategy. It could be that by observing a demonstration
of the movements our participants were more inclined to imagine
movements from an external perspective.
Indeed, a recent study (Williams et al., 2011) showed that
observation of movements could facilitate the ease with which
movements are imagined. In their study observation of a move-
ment shortly before a participant had to imagine a movement led
to higher MIQ scores only when the perspective of the observed
and to be imagined movement were congruent with each other.
Hence, it could be that in our set-up with the experiment leader
sitting next to the participant that participants weremore inclined
to use an external perspective and as such may have experienced
more difficulty imagining the movement from the first person
perspective. However, the test conditions were the same for con-
trol participants. Therefore, we believe this could hardly explain
the differences found on the MIQ-RS in our study. For follow up
studies, to better control for these issues, it would be better to use
the MIQ3. The MIQ-RS, as is also pointed out by Roberts et al.
(2008), cannot distinguish between the internal and an exter-
nal visual motor imagery perspective. In the new version of the
MIQ-RS, the MIQ3 (Williams et al., 2012), external, internal and
kinesthetic components are assessed separately.
Williams et al. (2011) also showed that motor experience
could influence how easily a movement is imagined. Although, in
our study we controlled for this by following the same protocol
for control participants and patients it could be that differ-
ences in motor experience still had an influence on the ease
with which movements could be imagined. Control participants,
unlike patients, clearly have had more chance at performing
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these movements more recently and more frequently than stroke
patients. This could have resulted in lower scores in stroke
patients compared to controls. However, our scores were simi-
lar to that of other studies. We showed a high internal reliability,
comparable to those of the original questionnaire (Gregg et al.,
2010). Moreover, we did see a difference between the visual and
kinesthetic scale, the visual imagery score was higher than the
kinesthetic imagery score, both in stroke patients as well as in
healthy controls. These results are comparable to studies with
the original MIQ-RS and point to a certain degree of sensitiv-
ity to dissociate between visual and kinesthetic imagery ability
(Butler et al., 2012). Also, a study by Confalonieri et al. (2012)
showed comparable scores to our results in a neuroimaging study
of stroke patients where the MIQ-RS was also used.
It could be that our patients adopted different strategies than
controls for solving the HLJT. For instance, a recent study with
stroke patients by Daprati et al. (2010) showed that patients
can in some cases adopt alternative strategies, for example use
a visual imagery strategy, for solving the HLJT. However, in our
study patients, like controls, showed longer reaction times for
biomechanical awkward stimuli and this effect was not seen on
the reaction time distributions of the visual imagery task. The
longer reaction times formore awkward orientations indicate that
patients and controls employed the same strategy in the HLJT and
that indeed implicit motor imagery was used.
Interestingly, when looking at the individual patients our
results are somewhat heterogeneous. Seven patients reported that
it was hard to feel the imagined actions whereas scoring well above
chance on the HLJT. Five of these patients also found it hard
to imagine seeing the imagined action indicating simultaneous
impairment of visual and kinesthetic motor imagery. However,
one patient (patient 5) also showed an interesting pattern of
results. This patient was selectively impaired on the kinesthetic
component of the adaptedMIQ-RS.Moreover, this patient scored
at around chance level on the HLJT. This patient’s performance
on the HLJT could not be explained by mental slowing because
performance on the simple choice task was normal. This patient
also scored well above chance on the visual imagery task, suggest-
ing intact visual-spatial capacity. The fact that his kinesthetic abil-
ity was selectively below the cut-off score simultaneously with a
selective impairment on theHLJTwithout showing other imagery
deficits suggests that to some extent correspondence between con-
scious experience and implicit ability of motor imagery is also
possible after stroke.
At the same time the heterogeneous results in our patients
show that the assessment of motor imagery ability in stroke
patients is a complex task. The patients that found it very hard
to imagine movements might not be able to benefit from men-
tal practice because of the emphasis in mental practice on wilful
conscious modulation of motor imagery. On the other hand, this
might suggest that these patients, because of their intact implicit
motor imagery ability, might still benefit from probing the action
system covertly, for instance by observing actions or implicit
learning. Given the recent research results on the differences
between implicit and explicit learning (see Dew and Cabeza, 2011
for a discussion)makes this question certainly seemworthwhile to
explore in more detail. In this respect Holmes and Calmels (2008)
have reviewed potential problems for motor imagery based men-
tal practice in the sport setting and have suggested that with an
observation based approach some aspects of the covert use of our
action system can be better controlled, a direction possibly also
worth exploring further in the domain of stroke.
Most motor imagery instruments are originally developed en
validated in young healthy populations. For instance, although
the original developers of theMIQ-RS adapted the instrument for
use in a rehabilitative setting (Butler et al., 2012), there are only
a few studies reporting results using the new MIQ-RS with stroke
patients. Stroke patient are a far more heterogeneous population
than the healthy young adults and this makes interpretation of
the results of motor imagery instruments in stroke patients dif-
ficult. This is particularly important because in stroke patients
the severity and extend of the hemiparesis can be complicated
by the presence of neuropsychological deficits in these patients.
Deficits in working memory, apraxia, depression, motivational
problems, (motor) neglect and anosognosia are all know in some
instances to complicate the hemiparesis (Gialanella and Mattioli,
1992; Paolucci et al., 1996; Pohjasvaara et al., 2002; Malouin et al.,
2004) and it is likely that the same is true for performance on
motor imagery measures, explicit and implicit.
For instance Malouin et al. (2004) showed that performance
of motor imagery practice is related to working memory capac-
ity. Furthermore, recent studies on neglect after stroke show
a more differentiated picture of different forms and types of
neglect. For instance, motor neglect is often under recognized
but can influence motor performance (Punt and Riddoch, 2006)
and patients can have neglect selectively for near space (periper-
sonal) as well as for far space (extrapersonal) and for specific
modalities (see Halligan et al., 2003 for a discussion). The notion
of neglect affecting extrapersonal and peripersonal space dif-
ferently is akin to the dissociation between first person and
third person imagery. A limitation of our study is that we
screened patients for neglect, however, we did not control for
all the different types of neglect leaving open the possibility
that more specific neglect types were undetected and influenced
the patients test outcome. In the same regard, other specific
neuropsychological deficits could influence motor imagery test
performance and the possibilities for and adherence with men-
tal practice regimes. Future studies that systematically study
the relationship of neuropsychological disorders with motor
imagery ability could greatly enhance our knowledge in this
respect.
Another limitation of our study was that we only used two
measures for motor imagery. By including other type of measures,
such as mental chronometry tasks, prospective action judgment
task and also including phenomenological self-reports that are
aimed at measuring other subjective components of the imagery
process we could be able to further our understanding of how
the different components of motor imagery ability relate to each
other. A better understanding of the type of impairment of
the action system by using different methods and instruments
ranging from implicit to explicit, self-rating, physiological, neu-
ropsychological and chronometric instruments, could potentially
lead to a better differentiated treatment tuned to the patients
characteristics in particular.
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Conclusively, our study shows that in stroke patients implicit
and explicit motor imagery can be differently affected. The sub-
jective experience of the ease of imagining a movement does not
have to be related to implicit motor imagery ability after stroke.
Given the recent advocacy for the use of screening instruments to
assess motor imagery ability of patients before they enter rehabil-
itation programs (Braun et al., 2006, 2013 in this issue; Malouin
et al., 2013 in this issue) these results have an important clini-
cal application and suggest that screening procedures based solely
on subjective instruments could risk excluding patients whose
motor imagery ability might still be intact. Our results articulate
the complex relationship between the phenomenological con-
scious experience of motor imagery and use of motor imagery
in individual patients and caution the use of one tool as an
instrument for use in screening, selecting and monitoring stroke
patients.
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